Everything We Think and Do is a Caused Thing?

If you've been following the CathApol Blog you've seen the recent postings regarding predestination and foreknowledge between myself and Barry Hoffstetter.  Well, another has thrown his hat into the ring, a fellow who goes by "Tobiah" - or perhaps Roy Tobias (I've asked for clarification, none has been forthcoming as of this writing), I'll refer to him as "RT."

RT, though he claims to not be a Calvinist, presents a very Calvinist position on predestination. He opened our discussion with this challenge:

Everything we think and do is a caused thing. I'd challenge you to demonstrate otherwise.

Now, before I go much further, let me state - I am not really in disagreement with that statement! However, RT goes on to say:

The apostle Paul said God created man to search for him, and ordered all things towards that purpose. He said we love God because *He first loved us*, and that even when we were dead in our trespasses and sin *He*(God) brought us to life-so that we could respond. And yes, there are grounds for judgement regardless-since we are all children of wrath by nature *until* that awakening comes from God via His mercy.

And again, fundamentally, I would agree with this.  RT goes on to ask:

Explain to me how you make decisions free of influences that push you in certain directions.

I'll get to answering that in a moment here.  In his fourth response on this topic he states:

I asked you from the beginning to demonstrate the mechanisms of free will. Describe it, where does it arise, how is it free-and just what is your definition of 'free will'? How do you make any decisions at all free of all the influences shaping them and the causality that led you to the decision?

Sounding a bit more Calvinist?  I think so!  

First off, to be clear here, "from the beginning" all RT did was make an assertion and issue an open ended challenge.  "From the beginning" he did not ask me to "demonstrate the mechanism of free will," nor did he ask me to "describe it" nor show "where does it arise" and neither did he ask "just what is (my) definition of free will?"  He did not ask, "How do (I) make any decisions at all free of the influences shaping them and the causality that led (me) to the decision?"  All he did was assert "everything we think and do is a caused thing" and then challenged, "I challenge you to demonstrate otherwise."  So, from the beginning of his involvement we began on a false premise.  That being said, I am overlooking the false statement and will deal with his questions.  

If the previous was not enough to convince the semi-unbiased reader that RT holds a Calvinist position on predestination, read this from him:

God has predetermined who will come to Him, as well as the how/why of it. You want to understand my answer, you need to think outside of your box-this is why I've tried to get you to answer about free will. It does not exist. Only causality exists-and the statement you quoted is part of that causality. So is everything else that causes people to come to Christ. What's to fear? Losing your salvation-which is a goad for those chosen to respond to this call of God in a manner that keeps them on the path. I'm showing you the nuts and bolts of how determinism works, Scott. We can go deeper of course-but the same principle is there every step of the way. Every step of the way causality is leading you along your predetermined path by predetermined means to a predetermined end result.

Catholicism and Predestination
Now, before we continue can Catholics believe in predestination?  The answer is yes!  Is it the same way of thinking which Calvinists express and teach?  No!   So what are Catholic teachings on predestination?

To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of "predestination", he includes in it each person's free response to his grace: "In this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place." For the sake of accomplishing his plan of salvation, God permitted the acts that flowed from their blindness.  

Catechism of the Catholic Church 600

What Catholics Cannot Believe Regarding Predestination

We not only do not believe that any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they are anathema. 

Council of Orange (529 AD)

If anyone says that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil as well as those that are good God produces, not permissively only but also propria et per se, so that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of St. Paul, let him be anathema.

Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 6 of the Decrees on Justification

That which God has predestined, He has done so through His foreknowledge of how men will respond to the free gift (grace) He has made available to mankind.  Romans 8:28-30 lays out this "order" quite clearly.  Many Protestants even use the example of the "Golden Chain of Salvation" as seen here:

(source: http://ubdavid.org/advanced/greatsalvation/great-salvation_13.html)

Predestination does not come before foreknowledge.  Foreknowledge does not affect the free will God has given to man, it just means that God knows what choices man will make and based upon that, He can predestine those whom will be called "the Elect."

Back to RT...   RT states that nothing happens which God did not cause to happen.  Man, in RT's paradigm, is not responsible for his actions - for he makes no act without God.  We have a real problem here, well, "we" don't, but RT does.  In RT's theology, God is justified in the condemnation of all men, for mankind has a fallen nature due to Original Sin and it is only through God's grace that any man is saved.  God, therefore, can choose whom He will save and who will remain condemned - because, again, all men are condemned by Adam's sin and this is due solely to His mercy and grace.   

The problem the Christian Church has with this Calvinistic view is that it really removes all judgment from mankind, for in that view - man is already judged and condemned and it is only by God's grace that man can be pulled from that condemnation - no judgment, just grace.  The Christian Scriptures clearly state that all men (not just the elect) will be judged according to his works (Romans 2:6; 1 Corinthians 3:14-15). 

The Calvinist will argue that only those who are drawn can be saved, and those whom He takes in His hands will not be lost (John 6) but who is drawn?  According to John 12:32 "all men" will be drawn to Him - when He is lifted up.  Was Christ lifted up?  Yes!  On the Cross!  You could even say that lifting happened when He ascended into Heaven - either way, He HAS been "lifted up" and thus "all men" are drawn to Him!  Now the Calvinist knows full well that the true Christian Faith does not believe that all men will be saved - in fact "many are called, but few are chosen," (Matt. 22:14) another implication that more are drawn than will actually make it, so where does this leave us?  It leaves the free gift of grace as freely given to all - but clearly not all will accept the gift.  If all are drawn and/or many are called - but few are chosen - this leaves the Calvinist form of predestination with God failing to accomplish the drawing and/or calling.  The only way this drawing/calling works is if man is given the choice to accept or reject God's free gift. 

Can We Make Decisions Free of Influences?
Getting back to RT again, his position is that God influences all acts of men - no act is then autonomously man's.  He challenges:  "Explain to me how you make decisions free of influences that push you in certain directions."   To be wholly free of influences is not possible, but those influences do not make the decisions.  Influences CAN affect decisions, but that does not mean they always do.  Men are tempted, all the time, to do what is wrong - but men can CHOOSE to do what is right or wrong.  If we choose to do what is wrong, we must be prepared to suffer the consequences.  If I choose to go over the speed limit on the highway, I must be prepared to pay the fine if I'm caught.


   .  

Spring-Wound Watch 
You've probably heard the adage that a watch needs a watchmaker to exist, right?  Suppose I found a watch.  I pick it up and look at it, and it does not appear to be running as the second hand is not moving.  I decide to wind it up and it starts ticking!   But it is the spring which is causing the watch to turn, and it's the mechanisms of the watch which allow it to keep time.  The second hand is now moving, the watch is ticking away.  I am not the designer or the creator or even the spring of this watch, but my action has caused it to start working again.  Who is the Prime Mover in this scenario?  Answer:  the Prime Mover would be the Watchmaker - but that watch didn't start "moving" until I wound it up.  The Watchmaker made the watch, but it was my action which enabled it to have its own action (of keeping time).  So, is everything we do a "caused thing?"  Yes, but who does the causing?  Just because there is a "first cause," (the Watchmaker) that does not mean the "first cause" causes every other action (like the watch mechanism actually moving or the winding of the spring - or even the choice to NOT wind the spring).


AMDG,
Scott<<<
 
RT has responded here:  https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/catholicdebateforum/conversations/messages/77849
 


 

Part 2 - St. Augustine on Free Will and Foreknowledge

Mr. Hoffstetter responded to my previous posting in the Catholic Debate Forum (use linked text to see the original).  Since there would be too much for a combox response, I'm posting Barry's reply and then my response to it will follow (Barry's posting is shown with yellow background):

On 5/3/2014 12:52 AM, Scott Windsor, Sr. wrote:     > Dear Barry,     > Thank you so much for recommending St. Augustine on this topic! This is     > really wonderful stuff!     >     > http://cathapol.blogspot.com/2014/05/st-augustine-on-free-will-and.html You citing this as though it in anyway contradicts anything I'm saying simply shows that you do not have a clue as to what Augustine is saying.     > sw: (Yes, I've read it before - just thanking you for bringing it to our     > attention again).   Here is another quote directly from Augustine. Maybe St. Ferde will  break it down for us and show what's wrong with it? The following is taken from Augustine's The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love: Chapter 98. Predestination to Eternal Life is Wholly of God's Free Grace.     And, moreover, who will be so foolish and blasphemous as to say that God     cannot change the evil wills of men, whichever, whenever, and     wheresoever He chooses, and direct them to what is good? But when He     does this He does it of mercy; when He does it not, it is of justice     that He does it not for "He has mercy on whom He will have mercy, and     whom He will He hardens." And when the apostle said this, he was     illustrating the grace of God, in connection with which he had just     spoken of the twins in the womb of Rebecca, "who being not yet born,     neither having done any good or evil that the purpose of God according     to election might stand, not of works, but of Him that calls, it was     said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger." And in reference to     this matter he quotes another prophetic testimony: "Jacob have I loved,     but Esau have I hated." But perceiving how what he had said might affect     those who could not penetrate by their understanding the depth of this     grace: "What shall we say then?" he says: "Is there unrighteousness with     God? God forbid." For it seems unjust that, in the absence of any merit     or demerit, from good or evil works, God should love the one and hate     the other. Now, if the apostle had wished us to understand that there     were future good works of the one, and evil works of the other, which of     course God foreknew, he would never have said, "not of works," but, "of     future works," and in that way would have solved the difficulty, or     rather there would then have been no difficulty to solve. As it is,     however, after answering, "God forbid;" that is, God forbid that there     should be unrighteousness with God; he goes on to prove that there is no     unrighteousness in God's doing this, and says: "For He says to Moses, I     will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on     whom I will have compassion." Now, who but a fool would think that God     was unrighteous, either in inflicting penal justice on those who had     earned it, or in extending mercy to the unworthy? Then he draws his     conclusion: "So then it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs,     but of God that shows mercy." Thus both the twins were born children of     wrath, not on account of any works of their own, but because they were     bound in the fetters of that original condemnation which came through     Adam. But He who said, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy,"     loved Jacob of His undeserved grace, and hated Esau of His deserved     judgment. And as this judgment was due to both, the former learned from     the case of the latter that the fact of the same punishment not falling     upon himself gave him no room to glory in any merit of his own, but only     in the riches of the divine grace; because "it is not of him that wills,     nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy." And indeed the whole     face, and, if I may use the expression, every lineament of the     countenance of Scripture conveys by a very profound analogy this     wholesome warning to every one who looks carefully into it, that he who     glories should glory in the Lord. -- N.E. Barry Hofstetter Opinions in private email do not reflect those of any institution with which I am affiliated     ****       This message originated in the CatholicDebateForum on Yahoogroups.       All rights reserved on messages posted to this forum, however       permission is granted to copy messages to other forums, providing       this footer remains attached to the message.       To visit this group on the web, go to:         http://groups.yahoo.com/group/catholicdebateforum/

And now my response to Barry:

    On 5/3/2014 12:52 AM, Scott Windsor, Sr. wrote:
    >> Dear Barry,
    >> Thank you so much for recommending St. Augustine on this topic! This is
    >> really wonderful stuff!
    >>
    >> http://cathapol.blogspot.com/2014/05/st-augustine-on-free-will-and.html
    >
    > BH: You citing this as though it in anyway contradicts anything I'm saying
    > simply shows that you do not have a clue as to what Augustine is saying.

sw: You saying that about what I cited shows you either didn't read it, or enjoy reading St. Augustine out of context.  Keep in mind, Barry, which church calls him both Saint and Doctor.

    >> sw: (Yes, I've read it before - just thanking you for bringing it to our
    >> attention again).
    >
    > BH: Here is another quote directly from Augustine. Maybe St. Ferde will
    > break it down for us and show what's wrong with it?

sw: Wow, "St. Ferde!"  Congratulations Ferde!  Of course we all strive for sainthood, it's nice to see Barry has recognized this in you.  :-)

    > BH: The following is taken from Augustine's The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope
    > and Love:
    > Chapter 98. Predestination to Eternal Life is Wholly of God's Free Grace.

sw:  I'll not requote the citation again, but would add that it's not really "Chapter 98" but "98" refers to a paragraph numbering and this passage is actually found within Chapter 25 which includes paragraphs 98 and 99 from the overall document.  http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/augustine_enchiridion_02_trans.htm#C25

sw: Now, what we see here is that Barry chooses (again) to make his point out of the context of the whole document.  If we read just a few paragraphs further down we see that what St. Augustine is teaching is that condemnation is "just" for all men due to Adam's fall.  We all have lost the first gift of immortality which was for Adam and Eve to receive, but through Free Will, they lost that gift and lost it for all of us - as we are born into that fallen nature.  God allowed for man's Free Will to go on unchecked until the time of Noah - at which time He "rebooted" mankind.  Still, the promise of the redemption of mankind was made to Adam and Eve.

sw: While mankind was "rebooted" with Noah, man's Free Will was continued to be allowed by God, and is immediately evident in the acts of even Noah's sons.  It would also not be long after Noah's time that man would build the "Tower of Babel" where God again confounds the Free Will of men - dividing them into what would become different nations.  Still, the promise of redemption is with us and going according to God's Will for mankind.  With that in mind, let us read a few paragraphs down from where Barry snipped his quote:

106. Human nature lost the former kind of immortality through the misuse of free will. It is to receive the latter through grace--though it was to have obtained it through merit, if it had not sinned. Not even then, however, could there have been any merit without grace. For although sin had its origin in free will alone, still free will would not have been sufficient to maintain justice, save as divine aid had been afforded man, in the gift of participation in the immutable good. Thus, for example, the power to die when he wills it is in a man's own hands--since there is no one who could not kill himself by not eating (not to mention other means). But the bare will is not sufficient for maintaining life, if the aids of food and other means of preservation are lacking.
Similarly, man in paradise was capable of self-destruction by abandoning justice by an act of will; yet if the life of justice was to be maintained, his will alone would not have sufficed, unless He who made him had given him aid. But, after the Fall, God's mercy was even more abundant, for then the will itself had to be freed from the bondage in which sin and death are the masters.  (Emphasis added)
Source:  Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Charity, Chapter 28, Paragraph 106, St. Augustine.

sw: One can see how, if St. Augustine is taken out of context, a Calvinistic interpretation can be made - which is why I encourage people to READ THE CONTEXT.  In virtually every situation where the Calvinist claims victory, context defeats him, and so is the case again here.

AMDG,
Scott<<<
--
Accendat in nobis Dominus ignem sui amoris, et flammam aeternae caritatis. Amen.


    ****
      This message originated in the CatholicDebateForum on Yahoogroups.
      All rights reserved on messages posted to this forum, however
      permission is granted to copy messages to other forums, providing
      this footer remains attached to the message.
      To visit this group on the web, go to:
        http://groups.yahoo.com/group/catholicdebateforum/

St. Augustine on Free Will and Foreknowledge

In a discussion on Predestination and Foreknowledge in the Catholic Debate Forum, Barry Hoffstetter, while declining to get further into the discussion asked us to "read (St.) Augustine on the topic."  To which I answer, PLEASE DO!  As much as the Calvinists love to claim St. Augustine - he was not of a Calvinistic (as anachronistic that might be) mindset.  On the contrary, he was quite a Catholic!  Keep in mind, this man was the Catholic Bishop of Hippo.  After his many defenses of the Catholic Church, he was named a DOCTOR of the Catholic Faith!  This simply doesn't happen if one is a denier of the Catholic Faith, like Calvin was.  Now, on to what Barry recommended us to read - and please note how he shatters the argumentation of Cicero...

Chapter 9.—Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Opposition to the Definition of Cicero.

The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything against them in argument unless he had first demolished divination.  And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things, and maintains with all his might that there is no such knowledge either in God or man, and that there is no prediction of events.  Thus he both denies the foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not refuted by him).

But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy and refute themselves.  Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable who assert the fatal influence of the stars than they who deny the foreknowledge of future events.  For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly.  This Cicero himself saw, and therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of Scripture, “The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.”  That, however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious and offensive such an opinion would be; and therefore, in his book on the nature of the gods, he makes Cotta dispute concerning this against the Stoics, and preferred to give his own opinion in favor of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the defence of the Stoical position, rather than in favor of Cotta, who maintained that no divinity exists.  However, in his book on divination, he in his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of future things.  But all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will.  For he thinks that, the knowledge of future things being once conceded, fate follows as so necessary a consequence that it cannot be denied.

But, let these perplexing debatings and disputations of the philosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may confess the most high and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power, and prescience.  Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do by will, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would do it.  It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and therefore opposed foreknowledge.  The Stoics also maintained that all things do not come to pass by necessity, although they contended that all things happen according to destiny.  What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things?  Doubtless it was this,—that if all future things have been foreknown, they will happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient cause.  But if there is a certain order of causes according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, all things happen which do happen.  But if this be so, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no such thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted.  In vain are laws enacted.  In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked.  And that consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of future things, and shuts up the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between two things, either that something is in our own power, or that there is foreknowledge,—both of which cannot be true; but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied.  He therefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and very skillfully for the good of humanity, of those two chose the freedom of the will, to confirm which he denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing to make men free he makes them sacrilegious.  But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety.  But how so? says Cicero; for the knowledge of future things being granted, there follows a chain of consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing depending on our own free wills.  And further, if there is anything depending on our wills, we must go backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the conclusion that there is no foreknowledge of future things.  For we go backwards through all the steps in the following order:—If there is free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God,—for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes,—but, if there is no fixed and certain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknew that they would happen.  And further, if it is not true that all things happen just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge of future events.

Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it.  But that all things come to pass by fate, we do not say; nay we affirm that nothing comes to pass by fate; for we demonstrate that the name of fate, as it is wont to be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby the position of the stars at the time of each one’s conception or birth, is an unmeaning word, for astrology itself is a delusion.  But an order of causes in which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of God, we neither deny nor do we designate it by the name of fate, unless, perhaps, we may understand fate to mean that which is spoken, deriving it from fari, to speak; for we cannot deny that it is written in the sacred Scriptures, “God hath spoken once; these two things have I heard, that power belongeth unto God.  Also unto Thee, O God, belongeth mercy:  for Thou wilt render unto every man according to his works.”  Now the expression, “Once hath He spoken,” is to be understood as meaning “immovably,” that is, unchangeably hath He spoken, inasmuch as He knows unchangeably all things which shall be, and all things which He will do.  We might, then, use the word fate in the sense it bears when derived from fari, to speak, had it not already come to be understood in another sense, into which I am unwilling that the hearts of men should unconsciously slide.  But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills.  For even that very concession which Cicero himself makes is enough to refute him in this argument.  For what does it help him to say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is not fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause?  It is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a cause.  For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not a mere name for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or other.  And as to natural causes, we by no means separate them from the will of Him who is the author and framer of all nature.  But now as to voluntary causes.  They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of whatever description, if indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid of reason, by which, in accordance with their own nature, they seek or shun various things, are to be called wills.  And when I speak of the wills of angels, I mean either the wills of good angels, whom we call the angels of God, or of the wicked angels, whom we call the angels of the devil, or demons.  Also by the wills of men I mean the wills either of the good or of the wicked.  And from this we conclude that there are no efficient causes of all things which come to pass unless voluntary causes, that is, such as belong to that nature which is the spirit of life.  For the air or wind is called spirit, but, inasmuch as it is a body, it is not the spirit of life.  The spirit of life, therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator of every body, and of every created spirit, is God Himself, the uncreated spirit.  In His supreme will resides the power which acts on the wills of all created spirits, helping the good, judging the evil, controlling all, granting power to some, not granting it to others.  For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from Him, being contrary to nature, which is from Him.  As to bodies, they are more subject to wills:  some to our wills, by which I mean the wills of all living mortal creatures, but more to the wills of men than of beasts.  But all of them are most of all subject to the will of God, to whom all wills also are subject, since they have no power except what He has bestowed upon them.  The cause of things, therefore, which makes but is not made, is God; but all other causes both make and are made.  Such are all created spirits, and especially the rational.  Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them.  How, then, does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes?  Cicero, then, contends with those who call this order of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself by the name of fate; to which we have an abhorrence, especially on account of the word, which men have become accustomed to understand as meaning what is not true.  But, whereas he denies that the order of all causes is most certain, and perfectly clear to the prescience of God, we detest his opinion more than the Stoics do.  For he either denies that God exists,—which, indeed, in an assumed personage, he has labored to do, in his book De Natura Deorum,—or if he confesses that He exists, but denies that He is prescient of future things, what is that but just “the fool saying in his heart there is no God?”  For one who is not prescient of all future things is not God.  Wherefore our wills also have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew that they would have the power to do it, and would do it.  Wherefore, if I should choose to apply the name of fate to anything at all, I should rather say that fate belongs to the weaker of two parties, will to the stronger, who has the other in his power, than that the freedom of our will is excluded by that order of causes, which, by an unusual application of the word peculiar to themselves, the Stoics call Fate. 

Source:  http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.iv.V.9.html

It is the opinion of this writer that Barry chooses not to engage the discussion because he knows it is a debate he cannot win.

Foreknowledge of God

Often we find Calvinists among us complaining that Catholics do not understand the scriptural concept of predestination and that when we use the property of "foreknowledge" we're detracting from God's sovereignty. I've been engaged in such a conversation with a Calvinist on the CatholicDebateForum - feel free to read the discourse between us - and several others - there.  For the purpose of this article I will focus upon a sermon prepared by Barry Hoffstetter, which can be found here:  http://my.opera.com/BarryHofstetter/blog/foreknowledge 

Where Barry first gets into trouble is in his statement:

There is absolutely no hint whatsoever that God's foreknowledge is conditional upon the actions of men (and hence, that the crucifixion itself would be conditional upon the actions of men) -- in fact, the vocabulary and structure of the passage strongly indicates the opposite.  

Let us consider what he's saying here.  The root of Barry's argument is foreknowledge is not related to the actions of men and he goes so far as to say "the crucifixion itself would (then) be conditional upon the actions of men."  Well, the crucifixion IS conditional upon the acts of men, or more precisely, the acts of the first man and woman who brought upon all of mankind sin and the need for a Savior and Redeemer to come!  It was due to God's love and mercy that He promised the remedy for the fall into sin.  That promise is first implied in Genesis 3:15 when God is speaking to the serpent (Satan) stating that since he deceived her that it would be her offspring which would crush his head.  This promise is followed up by dozens of other Old Testament references to the Messiah, but the point is - the Messiah would not even be necessary without the fall.  The foreknowledge of God did not stop the fall of mankind, nor the first murder, etc., I could go on and on - but again, without man falling into sin - there would be no need for a Messiah, there would have been no crucifixion.

Barry goes on to say:

The other occurence of the word is at 1 Pet 1:2, where it is the object of the Greek preposition κατά,(according to). Now, as has been pointed out, "according to" does not mean "because of" -- it again emphasizes, not causality, but that which characterizes a particular action in a variety of ways, or that which may show a relationship between two ideas or objects.

First off, I'm not familiar with where this "has been pointed out" that "according to does not mean because of," it's not part of this article/sermon.  However, fundamentally I agree - 'according to' does not mean 'because of,' but therein may lie the folly of Barry's premise.  The Catholic position is not that predestination is not due to foreknowlege "because of" - but predestination IS "according to" foreknowledge.  Since it is quite scriptural the so-called "Golden Chain of Redemption" (Rom. 8:29-30), and Barry himself has agreed to the "order" of this chain as you can see by the following exchange:

> > BH: Again, I am not arguing against the order here. The ordo salutis presented in the passage is clear. But don't you see that you are reading your definition of foreknowledge into the text?  The issue is not the ordo,  but the nature of foreknowledge.

> sw:  No, I see that I am reading in order. If foreknowledge comes first, then it "follows" that predestination comes "after" it.  To think He does not "see" this "prior" to predestining them would be to limit God's Omniscience.

BH:  There is a logical order to these things, and in that order, 

foreknowledge precedes election and predestination  (Source)

So here we are in fundamental agreement, however Barry argues that I am not coming from a proper perspective of the nature of foreknowledge.  So, what IS foreknowledge, exactly?  It is knowledge one has BEFORE something else.  Thus, as we see in the ordo of the "Golden Chain," foreknowledge precedes predestination and election.  All these tenets are related to each other, as they are all part of the same "chain."  Now, this "ordo" or "order" is something for our benefit.  We live in and according to time.  God, on the other hand, is eternal - and thus outside of our concept of time.  God is not limited to our view/perspective on time.  Being outside of time He sees eternity all at once - what is past, present or future just IS from the perspective of the Eternal God.  Therefore, the concept of "foreknowledge" is something from the human perspective which precedes predestination and election.  To surmise that such foreknowledge does not weigh in on the predestination of mankind would be rather illogical.

Continuing from Barry's article:

Here, the claim is made that the elect possess a particular relationship to the foreknowledge of God. Essentially, election is "in line with" or "characterized by" God's foreknowledge. Again, the claim cannot be made that God's choice is dependent on the actions of men. While the statement here is not quite as strong as that made at Acts 2:23, it still implies that God's foreknowledge simply means that he knows whom he is going to choose, and so chooses them. The choice is internal to God, and not based on any external criteria.

And where is this implication?  The text give no such clue that Barry (or Calvin) would have us to blindly accept.  Barry states that "the claim cannot be made that God's choice is dependent on the actions of men," but if that is God's plan - then the claim not only can be made, it must be made and accepted on faith!  Now, of course, it is my position that this is God's plan, that it is by His design and through His justice that any man who goes to Hell goes there of his own accord.  Likewise, if a man has accepted God's Gift of faith and accepts His Son as his Savior and Redeemer, and lived accordingly - then God in His justice will not refuse him.   Before I continue I must remind the reader of what was said earlier about our perspective and time - for this non-refusal of God is in our lateral view of time as it unfolds - not God's view of eternity.  In God's view He's already seen what choices each of us will make and whether or not we will persevere in His Truth.  He knows already from our perspective and to think He does not act upon what He already knows would be quite illogical, to say the least.

Barry concludes:

And even if we did find the preposition διά here (because of, due to) the passage still would not imply that God's saving work is conditional upon what he knew men would do -- that would have to be determined from context, and nothing in the context even remotely suggests such a possibility.

Well to begin with here, the context of Scripture includes Romans 8:29-30, and with that in mind we cannot say that Scripture (the context) does not even remotely suggest such a possibility when this "Golden Chain" literally screams not only the possibility, but the reality.  Whether or not the "because of" or "due to" preposition is present is irrelevant - for Scripture clearly states that predestination and election is preceded by foreknowledge.  The passage also puts "firstborn" into the picture - as though there is an "order" to those who will be conformed to the image of His Son.  For those who have ears to hear, let them hear.

The Golden Chain of Redemption/Salvation

For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.  Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.  Romans 8:29-30 (KJV).

Addendum, January 14, 2012 - Scott's response to Barry's response on CDF.  Both responses appropriately linked to their sources on CDF.  Since my response contains most of Barry's, I am posting mine here - again, Barry's is linked above and here as well.

On Tue, Jan 10, 2012 at 7:16 PM, Barry H. wrote:

sw:  skipping a bit of redundancy and getting to the main point....

>> BH: There is a logical order to these things, and in that order,

foreknowledge precedes election and predestination (Source) [link re-added]

>sw: So here we are in fundamental agreement, however Barry argues that I am not

>coming from a proper perspective of the nature of foreknowledge. So, what
>IS foreknowledge, exactly? It is knowledge one has BEFORE something else.
>Thus, as we see in the ordo of the "Golden Chain," foreknowledge precedes
>predestination and election. All these tenets are related to each other,
>as they are all part of the same "chain." Now, this "ordo" or "order" is
>something for our benefit. We live in and according to time. God, on the
>other hand, is eternal - and thus outside of our concept of time. God is
>not limited to our view/perspective on time. Being outside of time He sees
>eternity all at once - what is past, present or future just IS from the
>perspective of the Eternal God. Therefore, the concept of "foreknowledge"
>is something from the human perspective which precedes predestination and
>election. To surmise that such foreknowledge does not weigh in on the
>predestination of mankind would be rather illogical.

BH: Ok, you still are not getting.

sw: Oh, I "get it" just fine!  I get that you are blinded by your indoctrination to Calvinism and cannot logically consider alternatives to Calvinism because you approach anything which contradicts Calvinism as dogmatically wrong - as do most, if not all Calvinist apologists.  What you're NOT SEEING is that the very concept of "foreknowledge" is based upon a "BEFORE" and "AFTER" in a "LINEAR VIEW OF TIME."  Foreknowledge, therefore, is terminology for MANKIND.  Foreknowledge is something WE use to describe God's Nature from OUR linear view of time.  God, being and Eternal Being, is outside our conceptual view of "time" and is not LIMITED by OUR VIEW/PERSPECTIVE of time.  It is not I who is limiting God's sovereignty here - but Calvinism!  Your Calvinist arguments attempt to put the Catholic view into a limited box which you can dismiss - but it's not quite that easy, my friend.  My position is, and has been, that we cannot limit God or His sovereignty to OUR VIEW, for to God "time" is just a human invention to look at history, live in the present and consider the future.   For the Eternal God, "time" just "is."  Step outside your limited human (and Calvinist) perspective and consider that God is beyond such.
  

BH: I don't know how to get you to see this.

sw: I "see" it just fine!   I "see" that you want to forget that the "fore" part of "foreknowledge" not only implies, but SCREAMS in a LINEAR VIEW (which is OURS) that knowledge is beFORE the predestination.  Again, God is not limited to OUR VIEW. 

sw: Calvinism essentially states that the "decision" of God to predestine is NOT based in foreknowledge - thus foreknowledge becomes an irrelevant link in that "Golden Chain."  So, either that FOREknowledge MEANS something, or it does not.  Calvinism reduces that word to insignificance - and therefore DETRACTS from the context of Scripture.
  

BH: You are simply assuming that foreknowledge means that God will look down the
corridors of time,

sw: No, I am saying that if you are looking at TIME then there is a before and after - and FOREknowledge comes beFORE all else.
  

BH: observe that Scott is going to be a really faithful

fellow (he's got this blog, you see), and therefore, since God has foreseen
that Scott is going to be that kind of fellow, he chose him as one of his
own. Do you agree that is what foreknowledge means to you?

sw: In a sense - but since my life - from OUR VIEW is not over - I may or may not persevere in the state of grace.  I could fail at any point in TIME from now till the end of my life.  I hope and pray that I am given the strength and wisdom to remain in that state - but God already knows what decision(s) I will make in my life and has predestined me based upon this.  Now, this is NOT God being held hostage to my decisions (that's the typical Calvinist response) but rather God being consistent in His Divine Justice.  It would not be consistent of Him to have laws and punishments based upon the failure to follow those laws if those laws did not matter in the least and He had already predestined everyone in a reality devoid of Free Will.  It is precisely why folks like me see the Calvinist view of God as being merely a puppetmaster who controls His puppets and predetermines who they are and what they will become.
  

> sw: The Golden Chain of Redemption/Salvation

> For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to
the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.
Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called,
them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.
Romans 8:29-30 (KJV).

BH: Now, in this "golden chain" passage, and in any other passage where

foreknowledge is either explicitly mentioned or implied, does it say that
God looked ahead and based his actions on what the person was going to do?
IT DOESN'T SAY THAT. You are reading that definition into it.

sw: I'm sorry Barry - but words DO mean things - and "FORE" in the word "FOREknowledge" means that it is knowledge which comes beFORE.  Again, to speak of beFORE and after - implies a statement of TIME and as such - FOREknowledge PRECEDES predestination, as you concur, in the logical scheme of things.  I'm not reading into the words anything which is not there already - because FORE in FOREknowledge IS a statement of TIME. 

sw: The above being said, God is not responding to decisions of men, per se, but is responding in accordance to His Divine Law.  As has been said before "Law" itself is meaningless if the enforcement of said "Law" is not based in the actions of men either abiding BY the Law or going AGAINST the Law.  If you remove the acts of men from consideration then you're left with God as a puppet master - and that is NOT the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and their descendants, whom I might add - were blessed and cursed based upon THEIR actions!  The Calvinist view of predestination is not only not scriptural - it is ANTI-scriptural for it TAKES AWAY from the Justice of God and the fact that He is a "Jealous God," etc.  These terms make absolutely NO SENSE in a Calvinist form of predestination.
  

BH: The logical order of foreknowledge/predestination does not imply that in any way.

sw: If it is "logical" at all, then yes - the order not only implies it - it DEMANDS it.
  

BH: Calvin simply didn't make that up (neither, for that matter did Augustine,

who was very influential in Calvin's conception of the doctrine). Instead,
the doctrine is framed from the nature of God as omniscient and omnipotent,
and in the specific actions that God takes to accomplish redemption.

sw: St. Augustine, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Hippo, did NOT present Calvinism in his teachings on predestination.  Did Calvin usurp out-of-context statements from St. Augustine and invent an anti-Catholic/Christian viewpoint?  Perhaps, but St. Augustine (after his conversion) became a faithful Catholic and bishop in the Catholic Church.
  

BH: What does foreknowledge and election look like in particular terms? Consider Jeremiah:

Jer 1:5 "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were
born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the nations."

Upon what actions of Jeremiah was this decision made by God dependent?

 
sw: Consider the ORDER in which Jeremiah states it!  What came first?  KNOWLEDGE!  Before God formed him, He ALREADY KNEW him!  That's FOREknowledge!  He KNEW Jeremiah and then according to that FOREknowledge, God appointed him to be a prophet to the nations.  You have provided a passage which reinforces MY argument and continues to destroy your own.
 
In JMJ,
Scott<<<